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1 Introduction
Political risk is often one of the greatest constraints on cross-border investments in developing
countries. For example, political risk has consistently topped the list among other constraints
(such as access to qualified staff, macroeconomic instability, access to financing, and corruption) in
the annual surveys by MIGA-EIU of worldwide multinational enterprises (MNEs) in their longer-
term investment planning (see MIGA, 2011, and other annual reports). In addition to multilateral
surveys, some ad hoc incidents also continue to remind us of the perils of doing business in unstable
parts of the world. For example, in January 2013, the Japanese engineering firm JGC was caught
in a terrorist attack at gas plants in Algeria, with 10 Japanese killed among many other hostages
(Straits Times, 2013).
It is often suggested that MNEs based in the “North” have a universal advantage in FDI due
to their superior R&D and technological capacity or management know-how. See, for example,
Helpman (2006) for a survey of FDI theories, where MNEs are often assumed to be exclusively
based in the North. However, it is arguable that a MNE based in the South may be in a more
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favorable position to invest in the peer South with similarly poor institutional qualities than a
North-based MNE. For example, it is possible that South-based MNEs are more familiar with poor
governance environments from their experience at home, and thus are better able to operate in
environments of weak rule of law and heavy red tape. They may also find it easier to operate
in environments characterized by unreliable infrastructure, being accustomed to similar conditions
at home. As well, South-based MNEs may be more accustomed to political instability or civil
disturbances, and hence be better prepared for managing such scenarios.
The hypothesis that similarly poor governance endowments may be a source of comparative
advantage for South-based MNEs when investing in developing countries has been speculated in
the literature (Dixit, 2012), but has not been formally modeled or tested. In this paper, we develop
a theoretical model to shed light on this proposition. In particular, we focus on how institutional
quality affects the likelihood of political-risk events, by which we mean events that prevent the
firm from capturing/realizing its profit. For example, the event could be an adverse regulatory
change where the state confiscates, overtly or covertly, the firm’s profits via various means such
as breach of contract, non-honoring of sovereign obligations, or expropriation. Alternatively, it
could be political violence such as war or civil disturbance that disrupts the business operation.
The better the institutional quality of a country, the lower the likelihood that such political-risk
events occur. Firms can choose to develop firm-specific informal institutions (for example, human
capital to engage with the government, political figures, local communities, or nongovernmental
organizations), which can be deployed to mitigate the political risk when it strikes the firm.
It is shown that firms ‘born’ in the South with lower institutional qualities tend to invest more
in informal institution and thus are more relationship-based. This enables them to reduce the
objective political risk more effectively than firms from the North when investing in the same FDI
destination, all else being equal. This marginal advantage is bigger when the objective political
risk is higher; thus, South MNEs tend more likely than North MNEs to invest in the South.
An estimation framework is proposed to test the theory’s predictions, using the MIGA-EIU 2011
survey of MNE’s political risk perception and experiences. We find empirical support that a larger
institutional difference between the FDI home and host countries leads to a greater political-risk
perception and incidence, conditional on the home country institutional quality; while conditional
on the institutional difference, a North-North (home and host) country pair faces a lower political
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risk than a South-South country pair. Together, the results suggest that the North MNE does not
necessarily have a universal advantage against a peer South MNE; the South MNE could actually
have a comparative advantage against the North MNE when investing in the South.
More to be said about the paper’s contribution to the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the theoretical model on firms’
informal institutional choice, and how it affects the political risk perception and the locational
choice of FDI; the model predicts an interesting map of FDI flows across countries, both North-
South and South-North FDI flows, as well as bi-directional FDIs (where a country receives FDI
inflows and also sends FDI outflows) and uni-directional FDIs (where a country only sends FDI
outflows but receives no FDI inflows). In Section 3, we present the estimation strategy, the data
set, and the estimation results. Section 4 discusses potential extensions and concludes.
2 Model
Political risk as noted above is an important consideration when MNEs evaluates the profitability
of FDI among many potential destination countries. We develop a model in this section illustrating
how the institutional quality difference between home and host countries affects the political risk
perception of MNEs and hence their FDI decisions. This model is rich enough to incorporate not
only Noth-South FDI, but also South-South and South-North FDI.
We consider a monopolistic competition model, in which each firm produces an unique variety
and supplies the product to markets all over the world. We assume away any kind of trade frictions
such that the same price prevails in all markets. Under the assumption of identical CES preferences,
the world demand function faced by each firm is the aggregation of demand in each market. Let
X denote demand of the world market :
X = AP−ε, (1)
where A denotes the size of the world market, P the world price, and ε > 1 the price elasticity of
demand.
Suppose that labor is the only input used in production. Production incurs no fixed cost but
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only a constant marginal cost denoted by MC ≡ wφ , where φ is firm-specific productivity, and
w is the wage rate, which varies cross countries. Therefore, marginal cost is decreasing in firm’s
productivity and increasing in the wage rate of the country where the production is carried out.
2.1 Choice of Informal Institution
We first look at the firm’s response to political risk at home when FDI is not feasible. It is
straightforward to see that given MC, to maximize profits, each monopolistically competitive firm
will set a price equal to P = εε−1MC. Substituting the price into the profit function denoted by Π,
we have
Π(P ) = (P −MC)X
= Bw1−ε, (2)
where B ≡ (Aε ) [( εε−1)( 1φ)]1−ε.
Each firm faces a likelihood where a political event takes place that prevents the firm from
capturing/realizing its profit. For example, the event could be an adverse regulatory change where
the state confiscates, overtly or covertly, the firm’s profits via various means such as breach of
contract, non-honoring of sovereign obligations, or expropriation. Alternatively, it could be political
violence such as war or civil disturbance that disrupts the business operation. We call the incidence
a political-risk event. The probability of a political-risk event is hypothesized to be negatively
correlated with the institutional quality of a country. For example, the more stable the political
system, the more effective the government, or the better the rule of law in a country, the less
likely a political-risk event is to take place. Let r denote the probability of a political-risk event.
Countries differ in their institutional qualities. For convenience, we will also use r to index countries.
Countries indexed with a higher r are those with a lower institutional quality.
Each firm can choose to invest in firm-specific informal institutions (for example, human capital
to engage with the government, political figures, local communities, or nongovernmental organiza-
tions), which can be deployed to mitigate the political risk when it strikes the firm. Let I denote
the informal institution developed by the firm, where 0 ≤ I ≤ 1. When a political-risk event hits
the firm, with probability I, the firm can overcome the shock, while with probability (1 − I), the
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bad shock remains unresolved. Thus, the expected probability of profit loss facing a firm with I is
r(1 − I), which is decreasing in I. Let EΠ(I) be the expected operational profit of the firm; we
have EΠ(I) = (1 − r + rI)Π. Informal institution is costly to maintain; let C(I) denote the cost
function and C(I) = 1δ I
δ, where δ > 1. Thus, a firm maximizes its expected profit choosing I:
max
0≤I≤1
EΠ(I)− C(I), (3)
to satisfy the first-order condition: rΠ = Iδ−1, which implies that the optimal informal institution
chosen by a firm will be:
I(r) = (rΠ)κ > 0, (4)
where κ = 1δ−1 > 0.
Assumption 1 We assume (i) w(r) = w0r
−η where w0, η > 0, and (ii) (Bw1−ε0 ) < 1.
Assumption 1(i) captures the stylized fact that wage is in general increasing with the institu-
tional quality of a country, that is, ∂w(r)/∂r < 0. The particular functional form used implies that
the elasticity of wage is constant; let it be denoted by εw(r) ≡ ∂w(r)∂r rw(r) = −η.1 Assumption 1(ii)
ensures that I(r) < 1 for any r ∈ [0, 1], which means that in equilibrium, informal institution
invested by a firm can never completely eliminate the political risk.
Lemma 1 Firms operating in countries with lower institutional qualities (alternatively, with higher
political risks) will invest more in informal institution (and thus are more relationship-based):
∂I(r)/∂r > 0.
Proof. We first prove that ∂I(r)/∂r > 0. We then show that under Assumption 1, I(1) < 1.
Let α ≡ η(ε − 1) > 0. Note that given Assumption 1(i), I(r) = (Bw1−ε0 )κ r(1+α)κ. Taking partial
derivative of I(r) with respect to r, we have
∂I(r)
∂r
= (1 + α)κ
(
I(r)
r
)
> 0. (5)
1The assumption that εw(r) is constant is made for expositional simplicity. The main results of the paper will
still hold under more general functional forms for w(r).
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The above equation implies that I(r) < I(1) for all r ∈ [0, 1). Since I(1) = (Bw1−ε0 )κ and κ > 0,
we have I(1) < 1 given Assumption 1(ii). This completes the proof.
2.2 Political Risk Perception under FDI
Suppose now that FDI liberalization comes as a shock. As with formal government institutions,
informal institutions take time to build and internalize in a society/firm and its culture. Thus,
we assume that even with the possibility of FDI, firms are accustomed to the level of informal
institution they develop and possess at home.
Let PR(rd; I(rh)) denote the perceived political risk of a firm originating from country h and
undertaking FDI in country d. It follows that PR(rd; I(rh)) = rd(1 − I(rh)). Let rd = rh + 4,
where country h is of better institutional quality than country d if and only if 4 > 0.
Lemma 2 For given rh, ∂PR(rh + 4; I(rh))/∂4 > 0. In other words, suppose that firm i and
firm i′ originate from countries of the same institutional quality rh. If firm i invests in country d,
and firm i′ invests in country d′ such that rd < r′d, firm i will have a lower perceived political risk
of FDI than firm i′.
Proof.
∂PR(rh +4; I(rh))
∂4 =
∂ [(rh +4)(1− I(rh))]
∂4 = 1− I(rh) > 0. (6)
The intuition is straightforward. If two firms come from the same institutional setting, they will
make the same level of investment in informal institution, all else being equal. Thus, they could
mitigate political risk to the same extent if it occurs. Hence, a firm will be more concerned with
the likelihood of political-risk events, the more backward the destination country is. For example,
a firm originating from the US will be less concerned if investing in China than in Cambodia.
Lemma 3 For given rd, ∂PR(rd; I(rd−4))/∂4 > 0. In other words, suppose that firm i originates
from country h and firm i′ from country h′ such that rh < r′h. If both firms i and i
′ invest in country
d, firm i will have a higher perceived political risk of producing in country d than firm i′.
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Proof.
∂PR(rd; I(rd −4))
∂4 =
∂ [rd(1− I(rd −4))]
∂4 = rd
∂I(rh)
∂rh
> 0. (7)
The above lemma highlights the important fact that a firm from a country with stronger in-
stitutions is less endowed with informal institutions and less equipped to deal with a bad political
shock should it arise in the destination country, all else being equal. For example, a firm originating
from the US will be more concerned than its counterpart from Taiwan if investing in China.
Assumption 2 We further assume that (1 +D)I(1) < 1 < D, where D ≡ κ(1 + α) > 0.
Note that Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1(ii), and is thus a stronger condition. This assumption
is sufficient for the following lemma to hold.
Lemma 4 For given 4, ∂PR(rh + 4; I(rh))/∂rh > 0. That is, suppose that firm i originating
from country h invests in country d and firm i′ originating from country h′ invests in country d′
such that rh < r
′
h and rd − rh = r′d − r′h. Then, firm i (the “North-based MNE”) will have a lower
perceived political risk of FDI in a “North” country than firm i′ (the “South-based MNE”) in a
“South” country.
Proof. Given Assumption 2, we first show that ∂
(
I(rh)
rh
)
/∂rh > 0. The result is then used to
prove that ∂PR(rh +4; I(rh))/∂rh > 0.
∂
(
I(rh)
rh
)
∂rh
=
[
rh
I(rh)
∂I(rh)
∂rh
− 1
](
I(rh)
r2h
)
= (D − 1)
(
I(rh)
r2h
)
> 0 (by Assumption 2). (8)
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∂PR(rh +4; I(rh))
∂rh
= 1− I(rh)− (rh +4)
(
∂I(rh)
∂rh
)
= 1− I(rh)− (rh +4)D
(
I(rh)
rh
)
(from (5))
≥ 1− I(rh)−D
(
I(rh)
rh
)
(since rd ≡ rh +4 ≤ 1)
> 1− I(1)−D (I(1)/1) (implied by (8))
= 1− (1 +D)I(1)
> 0 (by Assumption 2). (9)
The above lemma summarizes two competing considerations when evaluating perceived political
risk. In the North-North country pair, although the political risk is lower in the North host country,
the North-based MNE is less prepared to deal with political bad shocks should they arise compared
to a South-based MNE. On the other hand, in the South-South pair, the South-based MNE has
more firm-specific resources to overcome political-risk events, but it faces a higher political risk
in the South host country to begin with compared to a North host country. The lemma indicates
that under Assumption 2, the host country’s institutional constraint will dominate the MNE’s firm-
specific informal institutional remedy such that the North-North country pair has an advantage,
all else being equal.
2.3 Optimal FDI Destination
Among the whole array of potential FDI destination countries indexed by rd ∈ [0, 1], each firm
faces the tradeoff between lower production cost and higher political risk, since ∂w(r)/∂r < 0.
Each firm faces the following expected profit maximization problem and chooses the optimal
country rd for FDI:
max
rd∈[0,1]
EΠF = (1− rd + rdI(rh))Π(rd), (10)
where Π(rd) = (Bw
1−ε
0 )r
α
d . The first order condition requires that:
∂EΠF (rd)
∂rd
=
Π(rd)
rd
[α− (1 + α)(1− I(rh))rd] = 0, (11)
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which implies that the optimal FDI destination country is of index:2
rd = min{H(I(rh)), 1}, (12)
where H(I(rh)) ≡ α(1+α)(1−I(rh)) .
The equilibrium home-host country combinations are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. We sum-
marize some useful properties about the schedules I(rh) and H(I) in the following lemma, before
discussing the results.
Lemma 5 (i) I(rh) is strictly increasing and convex in rh. (ii) H(I) is strictly increasing and
convex in I. (iii) Let r ≡ H(I(0)), r¯ ≡ H(I(1)), and {rˆ} = {r|r = H(I(r)), where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1}. If
r¯ > 1, {rˆ} is empty. Otherwise, {rˆ} is a singleton, and 0 < r < rˆ ≤ r¯ ≤ 1, where the equality holds
when rˆ = r¯ = 1.
Proof. We first prove Lemma 5(i). Recall that I(rh) = (rhΠ(rh))
κ =
(
Bw1−ε0
)κ
rDh = I(1)r
D
h . It
is straightforward to verify that
∂I(rh)
∂rh
= DI(1)rD−1h > 0,
∂2I(rh)
∂r2h
= D(D − 1)I(1)rD−2h > 0.
The above imply that I(rh) is strictly increasing and convex in rh.
We then prove Lemma 5(ii). Recall that H(I) = α(1+α)(1−I) . It is straightforward to verify that
∂H(I)
∂I
=
H(I)
(1− I) > 0,
∂2H(I)
∂I2
=
2H(I)
(1− I)2 > 0,
which implies that H(I) is strictly increasing and convex in I.
Lastly, we prove Lemma 5(iii). By definition, r = α1+α , r¯ =
α
(1+α)(1−I(1)) , and rˆ satisfies
rˆ
(
1− I(1)rˆD) = α
1 + α
.
2It is straightforward to see that EΠF is strictly concave and has a single peak since ∂2(EΠF (rd))/∂r
2
d < 0 for all
rd ∈ [0, 1].
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Let LHS(r) ≡ r (1− I(1)rD), and RHS(r) ≡ α1+α . It is straightforward to verify that LHS(r) is
strictly increasing in r for r ∈ [0, 1] as
∂LHS(r)
∂r
= 1− (1 +D)I(1)rD,
which is positive since r ≤ 1 and (1+D)I(1) < 1 under Assumption 2. As LHS(0) = 0, and LHS(r)
is strictly increasing in r for r ∈ [0, 1], we know that there exits a solution, which is unique if and
only if LHS(1) ≥ RHS(1). The inequality is equivalent to r¯ ≤ 1. If r¯ = 1, LHS(1) = RHS(1) and
rˆ = 1. This completes the proof of Lemma 5(iii).
As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the curves I(rh) and H(I) slope upward and are convex
in shape against their respective arguments, observing Lemma 5. The choice of FDI destination
country by MNEs given rh can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 6 (North-South, South-North, or No FDI) (i) If rˆ exists, for a given productivity level,
firms from countries with rh < rˆ will undertake FDI in a country with lower institutional qualities,
leading to North-South FDI. On the other hand, firms from countries with rh > rˆ, will undertake
FDI in a country with higher institutional qualities, leading to South-North FDI. Finally, firms
from countries with rh = rˆ will not undertake FDI. (ii) If rˆ does not exist, for a given productivity
level, firms from all countries undertake North-South FDI.
Proof. (i) Note that I(rh) : [0, 1] → [I(0), I(1)] and H(I) : [I(0), I(1)] → [r, r¯] are continuous.
By Lemma 5(iii), rd = H(I(rh)) > rh for rh < rˆ, implying North-South FDI. On the other hand,
rd = H(I(rh)) < rh for rh > rˆ, implying South-North FDI. (ii) The results are apparent as in this
scenario, the curve H(I) lies everywhere above the curve I(rh), implying that rd = H(I(rh)) > rh
for all rh < 1.
Lemma 7 (Uni- or Bi-directional FDI Flows) Countries with r ∈ [r, r¯] \ {rˆ} are characterized by
bi-directional FDI flows by firms of a given productivity level. On the other hand, countries with
r < r or r > r¯ experience only FDI outflows but no FDI inflows by firms of a given productivity
level.
Proof. The countries that will receive FDI are those with r ∈ [r, r¯], the range of H(I), while all
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countries r ∈ [0, 1] could potentially undertake FDI. Thus, only countries with r ∈ [r, r¯] experience
both FDI inflows and outflows, while the rest only FDI outflows.
As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, there are two possible home-host matching configurations,
depending on whether schedule I(rh) and schedule H(I) intersect. Configuration (a) emerges when
schedule H(I) does not intersect with schedule I(rh), that is, when r¯ > 1. Configuration (b)
emerges when H(I) intersects I(rh) once from above at rˆ, that is, when r¯ ≤ 1.
Under Configuration (a), countries are partitioned into two disjoint subsets: [0, 1] = R∅S
⋃
RNS ,
where R∅S ≡ [0, r), and RNS ≡ [r, 1], where the first superscript indicates the institutional ranking
of the FDI home country relative to country r, while the second superscript represents the insti-
tutional ranking of the FDI host country relative to country r. In the first superscript, a notation
S would indicate that FDI inflows are from a Southern country (with relatively low institutional
qualities), N from a Northern country (with relatively higher institutional qualities), and ∅ that
country r receives no FDI inflows. Similarly in the second superscript, a notation S would indicate
that FDI outflows go to a Southern country, N to a Northern country, and ∅ indicates that country
r does not invest abroad (no FDI outflows). For example, country r ∈ R∅S sends only FDI outflows
to South (countries with higher r) but receives no FDI inflows. Country r ∈ RNS receives FDI
inflows from North (countries with lower r) and sends FDI outflows to South. See, for example,
points A ∈ R∅S and B ∈ RNS in Figure 1. Country A receives no FDI inflows but invests in
a relatively backward country A′, while country B = A′ receives FDI from a relatively advanced
country A and invests in a relatively backward country B′.
Under Configuration (b), countries are partitioned into four disjoint subsets: [0, 1] = R∅S
⋃
RNS
⋃
RSN
⋃
R∅N ,
where R∅N ≡ [0, r), RNS ≡ [r, rˆ), RSN ≡ [rˆ, r¯), and R∅N ≡ [r¯, 1]. Country r ∈ R∅S receives no FDI
inflows but sends only FDI outflows to South. Country r ∈ RNS receives FDI inflows from North
and sends FDI outflows to South. Country r ∈ RSN receives FDI inflows from South and sends
FDI outflows to North. Country r ∈ R∅N receives no FDI inflows but sends only FDI outflows to
North. For example, see points C ∈ R∅N and D ∈ RSN in Figure 2. Country C receives no FDI
inflows but invest in a relatively advanced country C ′, while country D = C ′ receives FDI from a
relatively backward country C and invests in a relatively advanced country D′.
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Figure 1: FDI Home-Host Country Configuration (a)
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Figure 2: FDI Home-Host Country Configuration (b)
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3 Empirical Evidence
An estimation framework is presented below to test the model’s main predictions in Lemmas 2 and
4. In the equation below,
PRhd = β1(Gh −Gd) + β2Gh + αX + ,
the dependent variable PRhd indicates the incidence of financial losses due to political risk for an
MNE based in country h when investing in country d; Gh − Gd indicates the difference in the
institutional qualities of the MNE’s home country Gh and host country Gd; and X is a set of
dummy variables that control for the size and the sector of the MNE. Lemmas 2 and 4 imply that
the signs of the coefficients should be: β1 > 0 and β2 < 0, respectively.
Given the data available, we will also use the same framework to estimate whether the institu-
tional factors affect how MNEs respond to political risk.
3.1 Data
Our measure of political risk perception by multinational firms is based on the MIGA-EIU Political
Risk Survey 2011.3 The survey was conducted in June/July 2011 and contains the responses of 316
senior executives from multinational enterprises investing in developing countries. Quota sampling
was used to ensure that the survey sample approximates the composition of actual FDI outflows to
developing countries in terms of industry and geographic composition (MIGA, 2011, Appendix 2).
In particular, we use the following two sets of survey questions:
(i) In the past 3 years has your company experienced financial losses due to any of the following
risks? Select all that apply.
(ii) What tools/mechanisms does your company use to mitigate political risk when investing in
developing countries? Select all that apply.
The first question addresses eight potential types of political risk. These include transfer/convertibility
restrictions (that interrupt an investor’s ability to convert local currency into foreign exchange or to
3The survey raw data for 2011 are kindly made available by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
of the World Bank. The survey was conducted annually since 2009 by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) on behalf
of MIGA.
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transfer it out of the host country), the host government’s breach of a contractual agreement with an
investor, non-honoring of sovereign financial obligations/guarantees, expropriation/nationalization
by a host government, and other adverse regulatory changes in the host country. Also included are
violent political events of: war, terrorism, and civil disturbance, respectively, that cause business
interruption or physical damages. We can consider the question as measuring the incidence of
financial losses experienced by the MNE due to each of these political risk factors. The summary
statistics are indicated by Figure 3: breach of contract, other adversary regulatory changes, and
civil disturbance represent some of the greatest risk factors.
The second question provides us some information on whether and how MNEs respond to
political risk. Although a political risk insurance market exists (MIGA, 2011, with insurance
provided by national and multilateral agencies, or private insurers), it is apparent from Figure 4
that the insurance market is far from incomplete, and as a result, MNEs resort to various other
measures to protect themselves against possible losses due to political risks. Building firm-specific
institutions and relationship assets appear to be a typical response to political risk, as is emphasized
by the current paper.
To measure the institutional quality of a country, we use the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) and the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) indicators for 2011 compiled by the World Bank
(Kaufmann et al., 2010; Doing Business, 2013).4 The WGI provides quality indicators of a country’s
overall governance in six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability, government effec-
tiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. In constructing the indicators,
it relies on a diverse array of perceptions-based data sources, such as surveys or subjective assess-
ments provided by commercial business information providers, non-governmental organizations, or
multilateral organizations. In contrast, the EDB focuses more specifically on the regulation affect-
ing the life cycle of a firm, and ranks countries according to the readings of laws and regulations by
local experts involved in administering or advising on the regulatory requirements. Provided are
indicators on the overall ease of doing business and ten phases of business regulation: e.g., from
starting a business, to registering property and enforcing contracts, and to resolving insolvency.
4The WGI indicators are retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (The Worldwide
Governance Indicators, 2012 Update) and the EDB indicators from http://www.doingbusiness.org/data (The Doing
Business 2013 update). Irrespective of the publication years, the data used are measures of the country’s performance
in 2011.
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The original EDB indicators are converted to percentile rankings among all countries (0 to 100)
in the current paper so that a higher percentile indicates a better institutional quality as with the
WGI.
For each political risk factor or response (as the dependent variable), the regression was run
separately for each of the above alternative measures of institutional qualities. In the MIGA-EIU
Survey, each unit of observation corresponds to an MNE, who can potentially invest in multiple
destinations. We choose to measure the distance (Gh − Gd) by the maximum distance across all
specified investment destinations, in view of the theory that the destination of the lowest Gd poses
the greatest constraint and risk.
Figure 3: Financial Losses Caused by Types of Political Risk
MIGA WIPR REPORT 2011   |  65   
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Breach of contract
Adverse regulatory changes
Civil disturbance
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
Non-honoring of government guarantees
Expropriation/nationalization
Terrorism
War
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Question 7. To your knowledge, have any of the following risks caused 
your company to withdraw an existing investment or cancel planned 
investments over the past 12 months? 
Percent of respondents
annex 2 QUESTION 7. To your knowledge, have any of the following risks caused 
your company to withdraw an existing investment or cancel planned investments 
over the past 12 months? Select one answer for each risk.     
       
0 20 40 60 80 100
Transfer and convertibility restrictions
Breach of contract
Non-honoring of government guarantees
Expropriation/nationalisation
Adverse regulatory changes
War
Terrorism
Civil disturbance
Withdraw existing investment 
Cancel planned investments
Both withdraw and cancel 
Neither withdraw nor cancel 
Don’t know
Source: MIGA (2011) (Percent of Respondents)
Figure 4: Tools or Mechanisms Used to Mitigate Political Risk
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Questi n 8. What tools or mechanisms does your c mp y use to mitigate 
political ri k when inve ing in developing countries?
Percent of respondents
annex 2 QUESTION 8. What tools or mechanisms does 
your company use to mitigate political risk when 
investing in developing countries? 
 
Use of joint venture or alliance with local company
Invested gradually while developing familiarity with the local environment
Political/economic risk analysis
Use of third-party consultants
Scenario planning
Engagement with government in host country
Develop close relationships with political leaders
Engagement with local communities
Political risk insurance
Engagement with on-governmental organizations
Operational hedging (eg, setting up multiple plants to spread risk)
Credit default swaps
Provide support to a well-connected political figure
We don’t use any tools or products to mitigate political risk
Other
Don’t know
0 20 40 60 80
Source: MIGA (2011) (Percent of Respondents)
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3.2 Results
The results on the incidence of financial loss due to political risk are reported in Table 1. Not
all types of financial loss due to political risk depend on the relative institutional qualities, or the
home-country institutional quality (e.g., expropriation) and not all measures of institutional quality
matter always (e.g., getting electricity). However, whenever the institutional quality matters, a
very robust pattern appears. On the one hand, conditional on the same home-country institution
quality, an MNE investing in a country that is more different in terms of institutional quality
faces a greater incidence of financial loss due to political risk. On the other hand, conditional on
the same institutional differences, the MNE in a pair of home and host countries with absolutely
better institutions often fares better than the MNE in a pair of countries with absolutely worse
institutions. The signs are consistent with the theory’s predictions.
This suggests that a South-based MNE can potentially compensate for its absolute disadvantage
by investing in a developing country of similarly poor governance quality. In other words, the South-
based MNEs have a comparative advantage in investing in the South (relative to the North-based
MNEs), a finding that supports the proposed hypothesis and the motivating arguments given in
the introduction.
It is also interesting to see that the responses of MNEs to political risk depend on the institu-
tional quality in very much the same way as realized losses (Table 2). If an institutional attribute
matters, the larger the distance in institutional qualities, the more likely it is that the MNE will
adopt a risk mitigation tool/mechanism (e.g., political risk insurance, or engagement with host
country governments). On the other hand, the better endowed the MNE’s home country is in
terms of institutional quality, the less likely it is that the MNE will adopt political risk mitigation
tools.
Some interesting patterns also emerge in how realized political risk and responses vary across
sectors and firm sizes. The primary sector appears to be more sensitive to political risk in several
cases than the benchmark finance sector, while bigger MNEs tend to be more risk averse and apt
to adopt risk-mitigating instruments.
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distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level
Worldwide Governance Indicators
voice and accountability + + - + - + -
political stability + + - + - + -
government effectiveness + + + - + +
regulatory quality + + + - + - +
rule of law + + + - + - + + -
control of corruption + - + - + - +
Ease of Doing Business + - + - + - - + +
starting business + - + +
dealing with construction permits + - + - - +
getting electricity + + -
registering property + - + - - + +
getting credit + + + - + + +
protecting investors + - + - - + +
paying taxes + - + - + -
trading across borders + + + - + -
enforcing contracts + - + - + +
resolving insolvency + + + - + - +
Sector
1. finance (base category)
2. manufacturing +
3. primary + +
4. services +
5. utilities and other services + +
Firm Sales
1. <=$500m (base category)
2. $500m - $1bn - + - -
3. $1bn - $5bn +
4. $5bn - $10bn +
5. >=$10bn + +
NOTE: Signs indicated are significant at 10% level. Signs indicated for Sector and Firm Sales are those significant across most institutional indicators. 
Table 1: Likelihood of financial losses due to each type of political risk
Transfer and 
convertibility 
restriction Breach of contract
Non-honoring of 
sovereign financial 
obligations Expropriation
Other adverse 
regulatory changes War Terrorism Civil disturbance
distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level distance level
Worldwide Governance Indicators
voice and accountability - + -
political stability + - - -
government effectiveness + - - - +
regulatory quality + - + + - + + -
rule of law + - -
control of corruption -
Ease of Doing Business + - - +
starting business + - + -
dealing with construction permits - + - +
getting electricity + - -
registering property + - - + +
getting credit + - + +
protecting investors +
paying taxes + - +
trading across borders + - + - -
enforcing contracts + - + - + -
resolving insolvency + - - - + +
Sector
1. finance (base category)
2. manufacturing -
3. primary + + +
4. services - + -
5. utilities and other services +
Firm Sales
1. <=$500m (base category)
2. $500m - $1bn + +
3. $1bn - $5bn +
4. $5bn - $10bn + + + +
5. >=$10bn + - + + +
NOTE: Signs indicated are significant at 10% level. Signs indicated for Sector and Firm Sales are those significant across most institutional indicators. 
Table 2: Likelihood of using each tool/mechanism to mitigate political risk
Political risk 
insurance
Credit default 
swaps
Use of third-
party 
consultants
Develop close 
relationships 
with political 
leaders
Use of joint 
venture or 
alliance with 
local company
Invested 
gradually while 
developing 
familiarity
Political/econo
mic risk analysis
Provide support 
to a well-
connected 
political figure
Scenario 
planning
Engagement 
with 
government in 
host country
Engagement 
with local 
communities
Engagement 
with non-
governmental 
organisations
Operational 
hedging
